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! 
This paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia among 
geographical  areas  with  differential  access  to  the  only  independent  from  the  government 
national TV channel. It was available to three-quarters of Russia’s population and its signal 
availability  was  idiosyncratic  conditional  on  observables.  Independent  TV  decreased 
aggregate vote for the government party by 8.9 percentage points, increased the combined 
vote for major opposition parties by 6.3 percentage points, and decreased turnout by 3.8 
percentage points. The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals 
who  watched  independent  TV  even  controlling  for  voting  intentions  measured  one  month 
before elections.  
JEL codes: J0, D0, H0 
“Contrary to a common perception, mass media 
is an instrument, rather than an institution,” 
 – Vladimir Putin, to the director of independent 
radio station Echo Moscow.
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  In August 1999, Vladimir Putin, whose popularity rating was below 2 percent at that 
time,  was  appointed  prime  minister  of  Russia  by  its  first  president,  Boris  Yeltsin.  Eight 
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1 As reported by Alexei Venedictov, editor-in-chief of Echo Moscow, at a public lecture at the New Economic 
School on February 26, 2009.   2 
months  later,  he  won  the  March  2000  presidential  elections  in  the  first  round  with  52.9 
percent of the vote.  In the December 1999 parliamentary elections, the new pro-government 
party “Unity”—created less than two months prior to the election—finished second in the 
electoral race with 23.3 percent of the total vote. Scholars and journalists hypothesized that 
the massive and well-organized media campaigns by the state-owned television played crucial 
roles in achieving these electoral results (Timothy Colton and Michael A. McFaul 2003; Hale 
Henry, McFaul and Colton 2004; Sarah Oates 2006). Can mass media really have such a 
substantial effect on political outcomes; and if so, under what circumstances?  
A large body of evidence suggests that media has an important but rather small—in 
terms of magnitude—effect on political outcomes in established democracies, characterized 
by competitive media, stable party systems, and political parties with well-known and well-
understood ideological platforms. One, however, should expect a larger effect of media on 
political  outcomes  in  a  country  with  weak  democratic  institutions,  such  as  Russia  in  the 
1990s. Russia’s party system was unstable, with many short-lived political parties coming and 
going. Voters had little prior knowledge about parties and put substantial weight on new 
information, which mostly came from mass media during election campaigns. Parties ran on 
platforms with vaguely defined ideology, and ideological differences were often unclear to 
voters. As a result, issues not related to policy, such as candidate's charisma, were important 
elements of voting decisions. In addition, competition in Russia’s media market was highly 
imperfect: in many regions all major media outlets were controlled by the government, and 
voters only had access to one-sided political coverage.
2  
Despite the overall success of the newly created pro-government Unity party in the 
1999 Russian parliamentary elections, the success was far from uniform across the country.  
                                                 
2  In  countries  with  relatively  free  and  competitive  media,  persuasion  effects  of  media  are  mitigated  by 
consumers' ability to self-select to their most preferred media outlet (Ruben Durante and Brian G. Knight 2009). 
Media outlets, consequently, tailor their coverage to the tastes of their audience (Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse 
M. Shapiro 2010). In countries with controlled media people cannot do that.    3 
For example, the party received less than 14 percent of the vote in the city of Perm and more 
than 32 percent in the city of Voronezh.
 We show that to a large extent these differences are 
explained by the variation in voters’ access to an independent media outlet in different parts 
of the country. Indeed, if the governing party controls all major media sources, an access to an 
alternative  source  of  information  can  be  important  in  helping  people  to  make  informed 
choices.
3 In this paper, we estimate the impact of the only independent national TV channel, 
NTV, on voting behavior during the Russian 1999 parliamentary elections. Using data on the 
location of NTV transmitters inherited from a Soviet educational channel and geographical 
variation in signal propagation, we calculate the strength of the signal in each locality in 
Russia and on the basis of the signal strength predict the availability of NTV. We investigate 
two types of effects. First, we analyze the aggregate effects of NTV availability on the official 
electoral results in sub-regions (an analogue of U.S. counties). Second, we use data from a 
large-scale representative panel survey to investigate the media effects on the individual level, 
using the strength of NTV signal as an instrument for NTV exposure.  
We find a large and significant effect of NTV availability on the voting outcomes. As 
a result of NTV broadcast the pro-government party lost about a quarter of its voters and the 
opposition parties increased their political support by a factor of 1.6. In addition, access to 
NTV broadcasts decreased turnout by 3.8 percentage points. Using the individual-level data, 
we find that exposure to NTV had a significant effect on individual votes in favor of two of 
the  three  opposition  parties  (supported  by  NTV)  even  controlling  for  voting  intentions 
measured one month prior to the elections. NTV had a particularly large negative effect on the 
vote for the pro-government party among voters who were undecided a month before the 
election.  
                                                 
3 John McMillan and Pablo Zoido (2004) show that the existence of a single independent TV channel can 
threaten the stability of a corrupt regime. Their findings suggest that an independent media outlet can help to 
achieve government accountability.   4 
A key assumption for our identification strategy is that the availability of NTV was 
idiosyncratic conditional on observables, i.e., there are no unobserved characteristics of sub-
regions correlated with NTV availability that could drive the observed differences in voting 
behavior. This assumption cannot be tested directly, but we can provide indirect evidence to 
support it. First, we show that the location of NTV transmitters—the vast majority of which 
were built for the Soviet educational channel before NTV was formed—is correlated with the 
population size, average wage, and urban status of a sub-region; but, it is not correlated with 
other socio-economic characteristics of the sub-regions or pre-1999 voting choices, once we 
control for population size, average wage, and urban status.  Second, and most importantly, 
we conduct a placebo experiment by estimating the effect of our main explanatory variable, 
i.e., NTV availability, on the voting behavior in 1995 (instead of 1999 as in our baseline 
specification). During the 1995 election campaign, there were no significant differences in the 
political coverage of the national TV channels (NTV was not yet a national channel and had a 
negligible audience). Utilizing NTV’s availability as of 1999, which had a large effect on 
voting behavior in that year, we do not find that it had any effect on the vote in 1995. The 
results of this placebo experiment suggest that unobservable characteristics of sub-regions, 
which could potentially be correlated with political preferences of the electorate, on the one 
hand, and with the availability of NTV, on the other hand, cannot explain our main findings.  
In addition, we investigate the longer-run effect of NTV by looking at the results of 
the subsequent 2003 election. The political news coverage by NTV and other national TV 
channels was less distinct in 2003, as NTV was taken over by a state-owned company. We 
find statistically significant effects of NTV availability on the vote for the two liberal parties 
(supported by NTV in 1999) and on turnout. However, the magnitude of the effect on voting 
for liberal parties is substantially smaller than in 1999.    5 
We  calculate  persuasion  rates  separately  for  the  positive  message  of  NTV, 
encouraging voting for the parties supported by NTV, and for the negative message of NTV, 
discouraging  voting  for  the  party  opposed  by  NTV.  The  persuasion  rate  for  the  positive 
message is 8 percent, which is very similar to the findings in Stefano DellaVigna and Ethan 
Kaplan (2007) if we use a comparable measure of media exposure. The persuasion rate for the 
negative message is much higher: 66 percent. The large magnitude of the effect of NTV is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the weakness of democratic institutions is associated with 
a greater persuasion power of the media. Furthermore, both the high persuasion rate for the 
negative message and the negative effect of NTV on turnout are consistent with the findings 
of the literature on negative political advertising (Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar 
1995, Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Adam Simon 1999; Scott Deposato 2009). 
Recent  contributions  to  the  literature  employ  experimental  and  quasi-experimental 
approaches to deal with the inherent endogeneity of survey-based studies and show that media 
does affect voting behavior (see DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010 for a survey). Most of the 
evidence comes from established democracies and points to the effect of media on voting 
outcomes  through  its  impact  on  turnout.
4  There  is  also  evidence  that  both  television 
(DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007)  and  newspapers (Alan Gerber, Dean S. Karlan, and Daniel 
Bergan 2009) can affect vote for a particular political party, whereas James M. Snyder, Jr.,  
and  Strömberg  (2010)  show  that  the  coverage  by  local  media  affects  the  behavior  of 
politicians and, as a result, public policies.  
The evidence on the effects of media on voting outside the developed world is scarce. 
These studies suggest that media have a substantial effect on political preferences in regimes 
                                                 
4  Previous  literature  found  a  positive  effect  on  turnout  of  the  penetration  of  local  radio  stations  (David 
Strömberg, 2004) and TV stations targeting a particular group of population (Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Joel 
Waldfogel 2009), and a negative effect of the introduction of television (Gentzkow 2006) and increased access to 
national newspapers (Lisa M. George and Waldfogel 2006).    6 
other  than  advanced  democracies.
5  The  importance  of  media  effects  for  the  outcomes  of 
Russian elections in 1999 and 2000 was studied in Colton and McFaul (2003) and Stephen 
White, Oates, and Ian McAllister (2005) using survey-based approach. The latter work is 
most closely related to our paper, as it also tries to estimate the effect of Russian media and 
finds a significant media exposure effect on voting results. White, Oates, and McAllister 
(2005), however, use the self-reported vote choice and the self-reported presence of state-
owned or commercial television from a survey conducted 18 months after the elections. This 
methodology is subject to severe endogeneity problems. Our approach is superior from a 
methodological perspective because it allows us to evaluate the size of the causal effect of 
NTV on voting decisions. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  I  provides  background 
information on the television market and political landscape in Russia at the end of the 1990s. 
In  section  II,  we  formulate  our  hypotheses  and  describe  the  data.  Section  III  presents 
aggregate-level results. Section IV presents individual-level results. We conclude in section 
V. 
 
I. Background information 
A. Political Landscape 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s political landscape changed from one election to the 
other (see, e.g., White, Matthew Wyman, and Olga Kryshtanovskaya 1995; White, Richard 
Rose, and McAllister 1997; Ted Brader and Joshua A. Tucker 2001). New parties formed and 
                                                 
5 For example, it has been shown that media affects attitudes and vote choices in Mexico (Chappell Lawson and 
James A. McCann 2007), the extent of anti-Americanism in Arabic countries (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004), and 
the support of the authoritarian regime in East Germany (Jens Hainmueller and Holger Kern 2009). McMillan 
and Zoido (2004) provide an account of how the media was used to undermine democratic accountability in 
Peru. In addition, the lack of media freedom is associated with state media ownership (Simeon Djankov, Caralee 
McLiesh,  Tatiana  Nenova,  and  Andrei  Shleifer  2003),  resource  curse  and  low  incentives  for  bureaucracy 
(Georgy Egorov, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin 2009), low level of social spending (Maria Petrova 2008), 
and high corruption (Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder 2003).   7 
old ones disappeared. Partisan attachments, however, were rather weak, with the exception of 
the very loyal supporters of the communist party, KPRF (Colton, 2000).
6 
Our main focus is on the party-list vote in December 1999 elections to the Duma (the 
lower house of Russia’s parliament).
7 The main political parties that participated in these 
elections  were  as  follows.  The  most  popular  party  at  the  official  launch  of  the  election 
campaign in October 1999 was the opposition party called OVR (“Fatherland – All Russia”), 
which had centrist ideology and based its campaign on criticizing the government. It was 
created in August 1999 from a coalition of the two pre-existing centrist parties, “Fartherland” 
and “All Russia.” According to polls two months before the elections, OVR was expected to 
get 29 percent of the total vote.
8 The second and the third most popular political parties at the 
start  of  the  campaign  were  KPRF  (communists)  and  “Yabloko”  (liberals),  which  were 
expected to get 21 percent and 10 percent of the vote, respectively. Each of the other political 
parties was expected not to overcome the 5 percent threshold required for representation. A 
new political party, Unity (“Edinstvo” in Russian) was created on September 27, 1999. The 
leaders  of  the  party  officially  stated  that  it  had  no  ideology  other  than  to  support  the 
government  and  its  head  Vladimir  Putin.
9  In  October  1999,  Unity  was  still  completely 
unknown to voters and the official polls did not even include it in the list of competitors for 
the upcoming election. The results of the December 1999 election sharply contrasted with the 
forecasts: KPRF was first with 24.3 percent, Unity second with 23.3 percent, and OVR third 
                                                 
6 Russia’s political environment can be characterized as a “partial democracy” (David L. Epstein,   Robert H. 
Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran 2006). Such political environments possess some 
but not all properties of full democracies. “Partial democracies” have elections, but the competitiveness and 
fairness of these elections is questionable at best.  
7 Prior to the 2004 political reform, the Duma was formed by a mixed electoral rule. One half of all seats (225 
deputies) was chosen in single-member-district majoritarian elections and the other half of the seats was filled by 
party-lists voting in a single national district according to a proportional representation formula with a 5 percent 
entry barrier. 
8 See the results reported by a major Russian polling firm, “Foundation Obschestvennoe Mnenie,” on October 20 
1999, http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/policy/party_rating/o907003.  
9 The leader of Unity, Sergei Shoigu, the minister of emergency situations, said about the ideology of the newly 
created movement: “We do not bind ourselves to any narrow ideological direction. We are not centrists, rightists, 
or leftists. We are a party of consolidation of all healthy forces in society, free of ideological bias.” By “healthy 
forces” he meant the support of Putin’s government and Putin himself. Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 
8, 1999, as cited in Colton and McFaul (2003).   8 
with only 13.3 percent. Three other political parties passed the 5 percent electoral threshold: 
liberal  SPS  (“the  Union  of  Rightwing  Forces”),  liberal  Yabloko,  and  nationalist  LDPR 
(“Zhirinovsky bloc”) with 8.5, 5.9, and 6.0 percent of the total vote, respectively.   
Only three out of the parties that got Duma representation in 1999 participated in the 
previous elections held in 1995. These were KPRF (communists), LDPR (nationalists), and 
Yabloko (liberals); all of them were also represented in the Duma as a result of the 1995 
election and got 22.3, 11.2, and 6.9 percent of the total vote, respectively.
10  
Unity and OVR, the fierce competitors during the 1999 election campaign, both had a 
centrist ideology; and by the time of the subsequent election held in 2003, they united to 
create the “United Russia” party. United Russia became the main “party of power” in the 
2003 elections and got 37.6 percent of the vote. KPRF (communists) and LDPR (nationalists) 
also got into the Duma in 2003 with 12.6 and 11.5 percent of the vote. Liberal Yabloko and 
SPS participated in the 2003 election, but did not pass the representation threshold; they 
received 4.3 and 4.0 percent of the total vote. 
B. Mass Media Coverage of Election Campaigns 
What accounts for the change in voter preferences in the fall of 1999? Colton and 
McFaul (2003) conjecture that the massive support from state-owned TV channels caused the 
rise of Unity. During the election campaign of 1999, television played a very important role in 
disseminating political information to voters: according to a nationally representative survey, 
television was the “basic source of information about political events” for 89 percent of adult 
population, compared to 8 percent who named radio, and 3 percent who named newspapers 
(Colton and McFaul 2003, pp. 32, 241).
11 
                                                 
10  In  addition,  the  liberal  SPS  party  was  the  direct  political  heir  of  the  liberal  party  “Democratic  Russia’s 
Choice,” which participated in 1995 election and got 3.9 percent of the vote (Colton 2000). 
11 These numbers are consistent with those found by other scholars, i.e., White and Oates (2003); Hale, McFaul, 
and Colton (2004); and Ellen Mickiewicz (2008).   9 
Three major national TV channels broadcast political news in 1999. The two largest 
channels, ORT and RTR, were state-controlled. The third major channel, NTV (“Independent 
TV”), was a commercial network owned by a media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky. Gusinsky 
was in political opposition to Putin; and his channel, NTV, openly criticized the Kremlin.
12 
Many sources point out that the commercial success of NTV was not nearly as important for 
Gusinsky as the ability to gain political influence through the channel (see, e.g., David E. 
Hoffman 2002, p.172; Oates, 2006 p. 35).
13 After the election of Putin in 2000, Gusinsky was 
imprisoned for a brief period of time and was forced to sell his stake in NTV and flee the 
country (Tavernise 2000; Colton and McFaul 2003, pp. 216-217; Oates 2006, p. 36). 
During the 1999 election campaign, the coverage of political parties on the two state-
controlled national TV channels differed sharply, both quantitatively and qualitatively, from 
that of NTV.
14 The largest differences concerned the pro-government Unity and the centrist 
opposition OVR. The state-controlled channels ORT and RTR devoted 28 percent and 24 
percent of the news time to Unity, whereas NTV devoted only 5 percent of its news time to 
Unity. In contrast, the two state-controlled channels allocated 15 percent and 13 percent of 
their  news  time  to  OVR,  whereas  NTV  devoted  33  percent  of  its  news  time  to  OVR.
15 
                                                 
12 This is important as governments can influence even independent private media outlets and not only state-
owned ones (Nancy Qian and David Yanagizawa 2010). 
13 In a chronicle of Russian oligarchs, Hoffman (2002) describes the face-off between Putin and Gusinsky during 
1999-2000 in the following way. “In Putin’s world, Gusinsky was a marked man. His television channel, with its 
open criticism of the Kremlin and Putin, ran counter to all Putin’s instincts and desires… [Below Hoffman 
quotes Sergei Dorenko, the deputy director general of the ORT TV channel during the 1999 election campaign.] 
Dorenko said: ‘First of all, he [Putin] believed that Gusinsky was working for Luzhkov [one of the leaders of the 
main opposition party, OVR]... Second, Putin thought that Gusinsky rebuilt himself to serve American political 
interests. And third, Gusinsky cannot be controlled. He is strong and not a Putin man... Putin cannot stand beside 
anybody  whose  opinion  differs  from  his  own,  especially  publicly…’  ”  (Hoffman  2002,  p.  475).  Similarly, 
Sabrina Tavernise (2000) notes that “President Vladimir Putin has made no secret of his dislike of Mr. Gusinsky 
and …lashed out at the businessman publicly.” 
14  Three  independent  institutions  monitored  political  news  coverage  by  the  national  TV  channels  in  1999: 
European  Institute  for  the  Media  (EIM),  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe/Office  for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE), and Jamestown Foundation Monitor (JFM). In this section, 
we rely on their reports and on the work of political scientists to document the differences in political coverage 
across the channels. 
15 The coverage of party leaders was also quantitatively different. Sergei Shoigu, the head of the Unity’s party 
list, received 19 percent and 15 percent of the news time devoted to key political figures in state-controlled 
channels ORT and RTR, and only 4 percent in NTV.  The leaders of OVR, Luzhkov and Primakov, together got   10 
Perhaps,  even  more  importantly,  the  content  of  broadcasted  messages  also  differed.  All 
sources report that news reports about Unity were given a positive spin by the state channels 
and a negative spin by NTV. Exactly the opposite was the case for OVR. (See JFM 1999; 
EIM 2000, pp. 33, 36-39; OSCE 2000, pp. 16-18, 36; and also Colton and McFaul 2003, pp. 
56, 92, 114, 216; Oates 2006, pp. 33, 35.) In an interview with EIM, NTV's chief news editor 
Vladimir Kulistikov admitted that NTV deliberately allocated more time to OVR, in order to 
outweigh the excessive negative coverage of the party on ORT. He said: “We are sympathetic 
to the Kremlin’s opponents and we give them the floor” (EIM 2000, p. 38).
16 
Liberal parties were also covered differently by NTV and state-controlled channels. 
The differences were less pronounced in terms of the spin with which the news about these 
parties were presented, but were substantial in terms of the time allocation across different 
parties and in terms of issues important for the campaign. SPS  received 32 percent of all 
NTV news time devoted to political parties, while it got only 6 percent of news time devoted 
to political parties on each of the state-controlled channels (EIM 2000, pp.35-38).
17 The other 
liberal party Yabloko was almost never mentioned on ORT; but received similar amount of 
time allocated to political parties at RTR and NTV, 10 percent and 8 percent, respectively. 
Yet, a key issue of the election campaign was the war in Chechnya: the start of which was 
associated with the appointment of Vladimir Putin as prime minister. Yabloko was the only 
                                                                                                                                                      
4 percent and 7 percent of the time devoted to key political figures on the state-controlled channels, and 26 
percent on NTV (EIM 2000, pp. 35-38). 
16 State TV channels also actively engaged in negative campaigning. In particular, a Sunday newsmagazine with 
Sergei Dorenko shown prime time on ORT claimed that the OVR leaders Primakov and Luzhkov were involved 
in assassination plots and worked for the CIA with the sole purpose of overthrowing Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin (Laura Belin 1999; White, Oates, and McAllister 2005, p. 198). These accusations were not based on any 
evidence. Subsequently, Luzhkov sued Dorenko for defamation and won; but this was after the election (EIM 
1999, p. 39). David Remnick, a journalist from The New Yorker said that this newsmagazine was similar to “The 
Jerry Springer Show” (‘The black box’, The New Yorker, March 27, 2000, p. 41). 
17 The tone of coverage for SPS was similarly neutral across all channels (EIM 2000, p. 35; Colton and McFaul 
2003, p. 144).   11 
political party that actively opposed the war (Colton and McFaul 2003, p.151). Similarly, 
NTV was the only TV channel that criticized the conduct of the war.
18  
There  were  no  profound  differences  in  coverage  of  other  political  parties.  KPRF 
(communists)  received  very  little  time  (relative  to  its  broad  political  base)  on  all  three 
channels: 7 percent of news time for all political parties on state channels and 3 percent on 
NTV (EIM 2000, pp. 33, 35-36). The news stories about KPRF were presented without any 
particular spin (Colton and McFaul 2003, pp. 114, 121). LDPR (nationalists) received larger 
share of time allocated to political parties, but it was similar (about 16 percent) on state-
controlled channels and NTV (EIM 2000, pp. 35-38).
19  
Overall,  during  the  1999  election  campaign,  the  pro-government  Unity  party  was 
opposed by NTV relative to the two main state-controlled TV channels, while the centrist 
opposition OVR party and liberal opposition SPS and Yabloko parties were supported by 
NTV relative to the two state-controlled TV channels.    
The 1999 election was the only episode in Russia’s political history when different TV 
channels had different political orientations. During the 1995 election campaign, all national 
TV channels were state-owned and had similar coverage of the election campaign (EIM 1996, 
OSCE 1996). NTV already existed (since 1993), but was not yet a national TV channel.
  The 
broadcasting  infrastructure  used  by  NTV  in  1999  belonged  to  the  state  educational  TV 
channel (Channel 4 Ostankino), which did not cover political news. In 1995, NTV was able to 
use a small part of this network to broadcast for several hours per day, but regional television 
companies were given a priority to broadcast on this frequency and often exercised it. The 
                                                 
18 NTV showed casualties, refugees, and destroyed homes of civilians; whereas both state-controlled channels 
broadcast optimistic messages about military victories (Belin 2002, pp. 22-25; JFM 1999; Oates 2006, pp. 34, 
59). 
19 Media analysts suggest that LDPR attracted much of viewers’ attention due to its leader’s (ultra-nationalist 
Zhirinovsky) scandalous appearance. Sergei Kostornov, the head of the special projects department at RTR said: 
“Viewers need ‘bread and circus’… Putin is the ‘bread’ and Zhirinovsky is the ‘circus’ ” (EIM 2000, p. 35).  
Attracting viewers was an important task for all channels, as all of them derived a significant part of their income 
from advertising revenue (EIM 2000, p. 35).   12 
broadcasting  infrastructure  was  transferred  to  NTV  on  Yeltsin’s  orders  in  1996.
20  NTV 
became a national channel in 1998, which implied that no regional channel could use its 
frequency  without  the  channel’s  explicit  consent.
21  As  a  result,  the  audience  of  NTV 
increased dramatically, from less than 6 percent in 1995 to more than 75 percent in 1999.  
By the time of 2003 election campaign, NTV belonged to the state-owned monopoly 
Gazprom for a few years, ever since the successful takeover in April 2001 (see Masha Lipman 
and McFaul 2004, pp.61-64 for a detailed account of the takeover). The takeover lead to a 
replacement of most journalists and of the entire managerial team, which resulted in a change 
of the style of news coverage at NTV (Colton and McFaul 2003, pp. 216-217; Lipman and 
McFaul 2004, pp. 55, 62-64; Mickiewicz 2006, p. 10; Mickiewicz 2008, p.51; Oates 2006, pp. 
28, 34-36).
22 Most sources point out that qualitatively political news coverage on NTV during 
the  2003  election  campaign  was  very  similar  to  that  of  ORT  and  RTR.  Several  sources, 
however, point out that some quantitative differences remained in the amount of time devoted 
to coverage of key political figures; most of these differences, however, can be explained by a 
relatively low amount of time devoted to 2003 election campaign at NTV (OSCE 2004, p. 15-
16, Oates 2006, pp. 171-175). A noticeable but small difference in political news coverage 
during the campaign was that the SPS’s leader Anatoly Chubais was given slightly more time 
for uninterrupted speech on NTV than on the other two state channels (see Oates 2006, p. 
173).
23 
NTV was not the only independent source of information for voters in the largest 
cities,  such  as  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  their  surrounding  areas,  as  there  were 
                                                 
20 Yeltsin’s Order N1386, 20.09.96 Source: www.lawrussia.ru, accessed 02.12.10. 
21 Yeltsin’s Order N55, 21.01.98 Source: www.lawrussia.ru, accessed 02.12.10.  
22 According to Hale, Colton, and McFaul (2004, p. 310): “Under control of those closely tied to the Kremlin, 
the old NTV has gradually come to resemble the other two national television networks.” Colton and McFaul 
(2003,  p.  217)  described  the  2003  media  market  for  political  news  as  follows:  “In  nationwide  television 
broadcasting, Russia is closer today [i.e., in 2003] to a monopoly than in any time since the establishment of 
NTV in 1993.” 
23 If anything, one could interpret quantitative results of monitoring of TV broadcast as a very small bias of NTV 
in favor of the pro-government party United Russia, as compared with the first two channels.   13 
independent local TV channels with a limited reach available in these areas; there was also 
some diversity of opinions on the radio and in print media.
24  For the vast majority of voters, 
located far enough from Moscow’s TV and radio transmitters, NTV was the only source of 
alternative information about politics. 
 
II. Empirical hypotheses, the data, and identification strategy 
A. Hypotheses 
In 1999, approximately three-fourths of Russia’s population had access to NTV (Oates 
2006, p. 14, Colton and McFaul 2003, p.242).
25 Thus, one-fourth of voters located in parts of 
the country where NTV was not accessible were exposed to only one-sided media coverage of 
the  election  campaign,  as  they  could  only  watch  the  state  channels,  ORT  and  RTR.  In 
contrast, three-fourths of voters located in parts of the country that had access to NTV could 
watch the political news reported from the point of view of both sides of the political struggle. 
Our aim is to estimate the effect of the access to alternative media outlet on the political 
choices of the electorate. 
The availability of alternative media sources can have an important effect on voting 
behavior even if the information that they provide is not necessarily accurate (see DellaVigna 
and Gentzkow 2010 for a survey). One possibility is that media content is informative at least 
in some states of the world. In this case, rational viewers will not fully discount information 
provided by media and use for Bayesian updating of their beliefs about political parties (e.g., 
                                                 
24 The most prominent example of a local independent TV was TV-Tsentr, the channel owned by the Moscow 
government, favorable to OVR (according to EIM 2000, it devoted 71 percent of its news time to OVR). In 
2001, after a substantial expansion of its network, the channel reached 16 percent of population (Oates 2006, p. 
30). Another independent TV channel, also with a limited reach, TV-6, devoted a significant part of its news 
time to Our Home is Russia (the former party of power), Unity, and the communists (EIM 2000, p. 38-39). Most 
radio stations were neutral in their political coverage, but some devoted more time to OVR and the liberal parties 
compared to Unity, such as Ekho Moskvy and Radio 7 (EIM 2000, pp. 41-43, OCSE 2000, p. 19). Similarly, 
there were some independent voices in newspapers; for example, a weekly Argumenty i Fakty was favorable 
towards OVR (EIM 2000, p. 45). All sources point out, however, that radio and newspapers were a much less 
significant source of political news as compared to television. 
25 NTV had a satellite transmission (“NTV Plus”) that was available throughout Russia, but less than 1 percent of 
voters subscribed to this service (at the beginning of 2000 there were only 110,000 subscribers).   14 
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Petrova 2008; Scott Gehlbach and Sonin 2009). Alternatively, 
media outlets can have an effect because not fully rational viewers underestimate the biases in 
media content (e.g., Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, and Don A. Moore 2005; Erik 
Eyster  and  Matthew  Rabin  2009),  think  categorically  (Sendhil  Mullainathan  2002; 
Mullainathan, Joshua Schwarzstein, and Shleifer 2008), or double count repeated information 
(Peter M. DeMarzo, Dimitri Vayanos, and Jeffrey Zwiebel 2003). Having access to media 
outlets  with  alternative  points  of  view  may  also  discourage  voters  from  participating  in 
elections, particularly when mass media use negative campaigning (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 
1995; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon 1999). In the context of Russia’s partial democracy 
characterized  by  large  uncertainty  about  political  parties’  ideological  positions  and  weak 
priors of voters about political parties, most theories predict large persuasion effects of the 
media. Thus, we expect to find a large effect of the availability of NTV on voting behavior in 
the 1999 elections. 
Our main hypothesis is that there is a significant positive effect of the availability of 
NTV on voting for all parties that were supported by NTV (centrist opposition OVR, and 
liberal opposition Yabloko and SPS) and a significant negative effect of the NTV availability 
on the vote for pro-government Unity, which was criticized by NTV and praised by the other 
national TV channels. The prediction about the effect of NTV on turnout is ambiguous, as 
negative campaigning can discourage voters from participating in elections, but NTV could 
also convince undecided voters to vote for the parties supported by NTV.
26 The prediction 
about the effect of NTV on voting for parties receiving similar coverage on NTV and the state 
TV channels, i.e., KPRF (communist) and LDPR (nationalist), is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, potential voters for these parties should be less likely to switch to Unity when NTV is 
                                                 
26 Note that DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find positive effect of Fox News on aggregate-level turnout.   15 
available and, on the other hand, the availability of NTV makes it more likely that they switch 
to voting for the parties supported by NTV. 
B. Data Sources 
We construct our main explanatory variable using data on geographical coordinates, 
power, and frequency of the NTV transmitters in 1997 and 1999. These data come from 
Video International, a major Russian media advertising company. The data on transmitters are 
used to estimate the effect of NTV availability on the official voting results at the sub-region 
level  (second-tier  administrative  division  analogous  to  US  counties)  and  on  individual 
political choices using survey data.  
Data on the official electoral outcomes are from the Central Election Commission of 
the Russian Federation. Specifically, we use the data on voting results for major parties and 
voter turnout in the party-list Duma elections of 1995, 1999, and 2003. The data are at the 
level  of  electoral  districts  (officially,  Local  Election  Commissions).  Electoral  districts 
typically coincide with sub-regions in rural areas. In contrast, large cities are subdivided into 
several electoral districts and we aggregated voting results to the sub-regional level.
27 We 
exclude two metropolitan areas, Moscow and St. Petersburg, from the sample. There is no 
variation in NTV availability within them, as they have the status of regions; whereas our 
main specification includes region fixed effects. In addition, Moscow and St. Petersburg are 
clear outliers in individual-level analysis, which would have played in favor of our main 
hypothesis:  metropolitan  areas  had  the  highest  NTV  availability  and  the  highest  political 
support for liberal parties and OVR supported by NTV. We also exclude Chechnya, Dagestan 
and Ingushetia because of the poor security situation in these regions caused by Chechnya’s 
                                                 
27  In  Russia,  all  89  regions  are  divided  into  sub-regions  (which  is  our  unit  of  analysis).  Sub-regions  are 
administrative districts, similar to counties in the United States. A typical sub-region is an urban or rural area 
with a population of 200 to 300 thousand people. There were 2724 Local Election Commissions (“Territorialnye 
Izbiratelnye  Komissii”)  during  the  1999  Parliamentary  elections.  For  the  vast  majority  of  sub-regions,  they 
coincided with electoral districts; but some large sub-regions (typically, larger cities) are divided into several 
electoral districts.   16 
armed conflict. The resulting sample consists of 2268 out of 2325 sub-regions. Some of these 
sub-regions  lack  data  on  socio-economic  characteristics  and,  therefore,  the  number  of 
observations in regressions is reduced further to 2005. 
In the aggregate-level analysis, we use socio-economic characteristics by sub-region 
as control variables. These data are available for the years 1996 and 1998 from Rosstat, the 
official Russian statistical agency. 
For the individual-level analysis, we use data from a nationally-representative multi-
regional survey of voters from Colton (2000) and Colton and McFaul (2003).  The survey is a 
large-scale  panel  survey  of  the  Russian  electorate  held  before  and  after  the  1999 
parliamentary elections. The panel consists of 1324 respondents from 45 sub-regions in 31 
regions. After the exclusion of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the resulting sample consists of 
1148  respondents  from  42  sub-regions  in  28  regions.  The  survey  instruments  included 
questions on respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, political preferences, and the 
sources of political information. In particular, respondents reported which TV channels were 
available in their locality and which TV channels and programs they actually watched. Based 
on  these  questions,  we  constructed  individual-level  dummies  for  whether  the  respondent 
indicated that NTV was available and for whether the respondent watched NTV (equal to 1 if 
the respondent watched either daily news or weekly news magazines on NTV “almost every 
day” or “from time to time”).  
Table A1 in the online appendix summarizes the variables in the survey data for our 
sample. The first two rows of the table indicate that in our sample NTV was available for 73 
percent of respondents and about 61 percent of respondents watch NTV. These figures are 
lower than the aggregate figures for the whole country (77 percent for “NTV available” and 
64 percent for “watch NTV”) as we exclude Moscow and St. Petersburg.    17 
In addition, we use data from a similar survey conducted right after the 1995 elections. 
Different individuals were surveyed in the same localities as in the 1999 survey and were 
asked about their votes in the 1995 election.  
C. NTV availability and our identification assumption 
Our identification strategy for estimating the effect of NTV on voting behavior relies 
on the premise that voters in the locations with and without access to NTV are similar in all 
unobserved  characteristics  that  may  drive  their  voting  behavior  once  we  control  for 
observable differences between these locations. Later in the paper we present a validation test 
of this premise; in this section, we discuss whether this assumption is reasonable on an a 
priory basis and describe how we construct the measure of NTV availability.  
The broadcasting infrastructure in Russia was largely inherited from the Soviet era. 
The two state channels, ORT and RTR, were the successors to the two main Soviet channels 
accessible to almost 100 percent of the population. NTV was created in 1993 as a small, 
privately-owned  news  channel  with  the  ambition  to  become  a  major  national  channel.  In 
September 1996, it was granted the whole broadcasting infrastructure (i.e., the transmitters) of 
the national educational channel (Channel 4 Ostankino) which ceased to exist at that time. 
The location for the transmitters inherited by NTV was driven by the whims of the Soviet 
central planning system rather than by any strategic considerations. In 1997, NTV had 387 
active transmitters. By 1999, the number of active transmitters was expanded to 425. The 
primary reason for this was that a part of the inherited infrastructure was out of order and 
NTV  expanded  its  transmitter  network  mainly  by  conducting  repairs.  The  availability  of 
functioning  transmitters  in  1999,  however,  was  still  primarily  based  on  the  inherited 
infrastructure.
28 
                                                 
28 Source: Authors’ interview with the former anchor and general director of NTV, Evgeny Kiselev.   18 
Where did the Soviet planners build the infrastructure for the educational channel? 
Figure A1 in the online appendix presents the location of transmitters on the map of Russia. 
The figure illustrates that the transmitters were more or less evenly dispersed throughout the 
country, with the exception of a higher density around very big cities like Moscow and lower 
density in low-populated areas of Siberia. We have not come across a source that would 
describe the logic behind the choice of location. It is reasonable, however, to conjecture that 
transmitters  were  more  likely  to  be  located  in  large  industrial  cities.  This  conjecture  is 
testable. Table 1 reports the results of the investigation of the correlates of the transmitter 
location using OLS regressions with regional fixed effects. In the first column, we regress the 
dummy for the location of a transmitter in 1999 in a sub-region on a city dummy, population 
and average wage. All regressors have the predicted sign and are highly statistically and 
economically  significant.  In  the  subsequent  columns,  we  allow  for  a  more  flexible 
specification by including fifth-order polynomials of population and wage. In columns 3 and 
4, we present regressions of NTV transmitter dummy on the results of the 1995 election. The 
location of an NTV transmitter in 1999 is significantly correlated with pre-existing political 
preferences of the electorate, but only if we do not control for city dummy, population and 
wage.  Once  basic  controls  for  city  status,  population  and  wage  are  included,  electoral 
variables do not add any explanatory power (R-squared does not change from column 2 to 
column 4) and become individually and jointly insignificant. In column 5, we verify that other 
socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  sub-regions  do  not  add  explanatory  power  to  the 
regression explaining the choice of transmitter location. The last three rows of the table show 
F-statistics  for  the  joint  significance  of  the  three  groups  of  variables:  only  the  basic 
determinants of transmitter location, namely, city dummy, population and wage, are jointly 
statistically significant. Finally, column 6 studies the determinants of the change in transmitter 
location from 1997 to 1999 (as we include transmitters in 1997 as an additional control).   19 
Again,  we  find  that  1995  election  results  are  jointly  insignificant,  and  therefore,  we  can 
conclude that the expansion of the NTV network of transmitters from 1997 to 1999 also was 
not aimed at reaching specific groups of voters. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Due to varying distances and topography, not all areas within sub-regions where NTV 
transmitters were located actually received NTV signal and some of the areas of sub-regions 
that had no NTV transmitter received strong signals from neighboring sub-regions. In our 
survey data, 19 percent of respondents reported that NTV is not available in sub-regions with 
an  NTV  transmitter  and  60  percent  of  respondents  reported  that  it  was  available  in  sub-
regions without a transmitter. We use data on the location and power of NTV transmitters in 
order to determine areas where NTV was available.  
First, we determine the power of the NTV signal for each of the Russia’s sub-regions. 
Similarly  to  Benjamin  Olken  (2008),  we  apply  the  Irregular  Terrain  Model  (George  A. 
Hufford  2002)  to  calculate  the  signal  loss  caused  by  physical  distance  and  topography 
between the transmitting and receiving locations. The model allows calculating the signal 
power for each sub-region-transmitter pair using the geographical center of each sub-region as 
the receiving location.
 Our measure of the signal strength for each sub-region is the maximum 
of the signal powers across all transmitters.
29  
  Second, we estimate the relationship between the probability that a respondent in our 
survey reports that NTV is available and the NTV signal strength in the respective sub-region 
with a probit regression. The estimation results are as follows: 
 
(1) 
                                                 
29 Russia is characterized by high distances and relatively low variation in topography. Thus, in contrast to Olken 
(2008)  who  controls  for  the  free-space  signal  strength  and  uses  only  the  variation  in  signal  power  due  to 
topography, we use the variation in the signal strength driven both by topography and physical distance.   20 
There are 1311 observations from 45 sub-regions. Using this estimated equation, we 
predict the probability that NTV is available in and out of sample, i.e., in the rest of the sub-
regions.  For  urban  sub-regions  in  which  NTV  was  available  via  free  cable,  we  set  the 
predicted probability that NTV was available at its maximum value among other sub-regions. 
In the analysis of the effect of NTV on voting outcomes as our primary measure of NTV 
availability  we  use  the  predicted  probability  that  NTV  was  available  as  it  allows  easier 
interpretation of the size of the effect compared to using other functions of signal strength.  
Figure A1 in the online appendix presents the map showing the predicted probability that 
NTV is available (henceforth, NTV availability, in short) by sub-region. NTV availability 
varies between 0.25 and 0.91 with the mean of 0.58 and standard deviation of 0.09. Table A2 
in the online appendix presents summary statistics for socio-economic characteristics of sub-
regions with high and low NTV availability along with summary statistics for the election 
results in 1995 and 1999. Differences in these variables for the two groups of sub-regions are 
almost  always  statistically  significant;  but  the  comparison  is  based  on  the  unconditional 
means and does not take into account regional fixed effects or differences in population, wage 
or urban/rural status between the two groups of sub-regions. Below we present the results of a 
placebo experiment, which provides additional evidence that pre-existing political preferences 
of  the  electorate  did  not  systematically  differ  with  NTV  availability  conditional  on 
observables. Figures A2 and A3 in the online appendix  present electoral maps with voting 
results for Unity and OVR in 1999 by sub-region.  
III. Aggregate-level results 
A. Benchmark results 
In order to test whether NTV availability had an effect on aggregate voting outcomes 
in 1999 elections, we estimate the following model:   21 
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s,1999  is  the  percent  of  votes  for  party  j  in  sub-region  s  at  the  1999  Duma  elections; 
NTVs,1999 is the predicted NTV availability in sub-region s in 1999, Xs,1995 is a vector of 
electoral outcomes in 1995 elections, Es,1998 is a set of socio-economic characteristics of sub-
region s measured in 1998, and   are region fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted to 
allow for clusters within each region. 
The  vector  of  socio-economic  controls  Es,1998  in  the  baseline  regressions  includes 
dummy  for  cities,  the  fifth-order  polynomial  of  population,  the  fifth-order  polynomial  of 
average wage (as the direct determinants of NTV availability) and the number of doctors and 
nurses per capita (as a proxy for the quality of public goods provision, which can be an 
important determinant of voting for the pro-government party). We verified that our results 
are  robust  to  including  a  larger  set  of  socio-economic  controls  (such  as  migration  rate, 
average pension, the fraction of retired people, the fraction of unemployed, the number of 
people employed in farms, and crime rate). 
Table 2 presents regression results for the vote for major parties and voter turnout. 
Panel A presents results for the main party opposed by NTV, Unity, and the main centrist 
opposition  party  supported  by  NTV,  OVR.  Panel  B  looks  at  the  effect  on  liberal  parties 
supported by NTV, SPS and Yabloko. Panel C features the effect of NTV on parties that got 
similar coverage by NTV and the state television channels. Finally, Panel D looks at the effect 
on  voter  turnout.  Two  sets  of  results  are  presented  for  each  outcome:  without  and  with 
controls for the election results from 1995. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The  vote  for  Unity  was  significantly  smaller  in  sub-regions  with  higher  NTV 
availability.  The  magnitude  of  the  effect  is  large:  a  ten  percent  increase  in  the  NTV 
availability (i.e., the predicted probability that NTV is available) in a sub-region (which is 
r !  22 
slightly  above  one  standard  deviation)  leads  to  a  decrease  of  the  vote  for  Unity  of  1.55 
percentage points. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that NTV was a successful 
counterweight to the pro-government, pro-Unity propaganda broadcast by the two main state 
channels.  The  effect  of  NTV  availability  on  the  combined  vote  for  the  three  opposition 
parties, supported by this channel, is significantly positive. An increase in the predicted NTV 
availability  by  ten  percentage  points  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  vote  for  OVR  of  0.36 
percentage points, for SPS of 0.35 percentage points, and for Yabloko of 0.38 percentage 
points. In addition, it leads to a decline in turnout of about 0.67 percentage points. These 
results  are  qualitatively  robust  to  excluding  the  1995  electoral  outcomes  from  the  list  of 
covariates, but the magnitudes of the effects in that case become slightly larger.
30 
In  addition,  we  find  smaller  but  statistically  significant  effects  on  parties  with  no 
difference in coverage (as we discussed in hypotheses section, the theoretical prediction for 
the  effect  on  these  parties  is  ambiguous).  When  NTV  availability  was  greater  by  ten 
percentage points, KPRF (the communist party) gained 0.39 percentage points (if we do not 
control for 1995 electoral outcomes, the effect is smaller in magnitude and insignificant); and 
LDPR (the nationalist party) lost about 0.14 percentage points.  
Two  exercises  help  to  interpret  the  magnitude  of  the  estimated  effects.  First,  we 
calculate the overall effect of NTV broadcasts on voting outcomes by comparing the vote for 
each of the parties to what it would have been had NTV not been there at all. To predict 
voting results in the counterfactual scenario of zero NTV availability in all sub-regions, we 
                                                 
30 Regressions presented in Table 2 put equal weight on all sub-regions. We have also estimated regressions 
weighted by sub-regional population; the size and statistical significance of the coefficients of interest are robust 
to such weighting (not reported). We also check if the results hold for specification in which identification relies 
only on variation in topology, i.e. in which we add  a dummy variable for presence of transmitter in sub-region 
and the fifth order polynomial of the “predicted free-space (not obstructed by mountains or curvature of the 
Earth) signal strength” as additional controls. The effect of NTV on the vote for Unity, Yabloko and KPRF is 
robust. For the effect on OVR and SPS the results are the same if we do not control for electoral outcomes in 
1995, but lose their significance if these controls are included. The effect on voter turnout remains significant 
except for the case in which we control both for the dummy variable for presence of transmitter in sub-region 
and predicted free-space signal strength, but do not control for electoral outcomes in 1995. The effect on vote for 
LDPR is present when we include the dummy variable for presence of transmitter in sub-region, but loses 
significance if we control for the predicted free-space signal strength.   23 
use the estimated equation (1) with the full set of covariates (including the electoral outcomes 
of 1995) set to their mean values in the sample with the exception of NTV availability, which 
is set to zero. The predicted vote in our sample (which excludes Moscow and St. Petersburg) 
in  the  counterfactual  scenario  without  NTV  is  as  follows:  Unity  would  have  gotten  36.9 
percent of the total vote, parties supported by NTV would have received 10.7 percent of the 
total vote, and the turnout would have been 59.8 percent. We compare these numbers to the 
predicted vote at the mean value for all the covariates including NTV. Therefore, the overall 
effect for each party is equal to the estimated coefficient on NTV availability times the mean 
value of NTV availability. This calculation indicates that as a result of NTV broadcast, the 
aggregate vote for the government party decreased by 8.9 percentage points, the combined 
vote  for  the  major  opposition  parties  increased  by  6.3  percentage  points,  while  turnout 
decreased by 3.8 percentage points. Thus, the government party lost about a quarter of its 
voters and the opposition parties increased their political support by about 60 percent as a 
result  of  NTV  broadcast.  Since  our  sample  includes  88.4  million  registered  voters,  these 
results imply that as a result of NTV broadcasts, 5.7 million voters decided not to vote for 
Unity, 2.8 million voters decided to vote for OVR, SPS, and Yabloko, and 3.4 million voters 
decided not to participate in the election. 
The  second  exercise  is  to  calculate  persuasion  rates,  as  they  help  to  compare  our 
estimates with others available in the literature (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; DellaVigna 
and Kaplan 2007). The persuasion rate, in our case, is the fraction of the audience of a media 
outlet who were convinced to change their behavior as a result of being exposed to this media 
outlet. Our approach differs from that of DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) in the following three 
respects: First, we focus on the case of continuous exposure by analyzing the effect of an 
infinitesimal change in NTV exposure. Second, we allow turnout to decrease for those voters 
who received the NTV message, as some people who would have voted in the absence of the   24 
message may decide to abstain from turning up for the election. This assumption is dictated 
by the data, as, according to our results (i.e., Table 2), the predicted availability of NTV had a 
negative  effect  on  turnout  in  our  sample,  whereas  in  DellaVigna  and  Kaplan  (2007)  the 
estimated effect of Fox News on turnout is positive. And third, a distinctive feature of the 
television programs in Russia in 1999 was the negative campaigning against some parties, so 
that the differences in the content of different TV channels can be interpreted either as the 
differences in the positive message (i.e., the encouragement to vote for a specific party) or as 
the differences in the negative message (i.e., the discouragement to vote for a specific party). 
The  difference  between  the  two  interpretations  is  particularly  important  in  multi-party 
systems (such as Russia). Thus, we calculate separately the persuasion rates of the positive 
and of the negative messages of NTV.  
By assumption, the persuasion rate of a positive message to vote for a specific party 
applies only to those who (in the absence of the message) would have voted for the other 
parties or would not have voted at all. We denote the number of people who would have voted 
for the supported parties even without NTV by . Then, the exposure to the positive message 
of NTV (“Vote for OVR, SPS, or Yabloko”) increases this number by  , where   is 
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where ! is the vote share of supported parties and t is turnout. See the online appendix for 
details on the derivation of the formula. As !0  we take the predicted vote without NTV, as 
described  in  the  previous  paragraph.  !
!"
!"  is  measured  as  the  product  of  the  sum  of  the 
coefficients  on  NTV  availability  for  supported  parties,  which  are  the  estimates  of  the 
derivative with regard to availability rather than exposure (i.e., the fourth column in Panel A 
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and the second and fourth columns in Panel B of Table 2) and the inverse of the share of 
voters who watch NTV when it is available (which equals 0.81 in individual-level data). 
Similarly, the derivative of turnout with respect to exposure equals the coefficient on turnout 
(the second column of Panel D in table 2) divided by the share of voters who watch NTV 
when it is available. We evaluate f at t = t0. Thus, the persuasion rate of the positive message 
of  NTV  is  equal  to  7.7  percent:    f=1/(1-0.58*0.107)[0.58*(3.62+3.52+3.85)/ 
0.81+0.107*6.67/0.81]=7.7 percent. Thus, the persuasion rate of the positive message of NTV 
is comparable to the one found in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), i.e., 8 percent, and lower 
than the persuasion rate of 20.0 percent found in Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009).
31 
Voters who can potentially respond to the negative message (“do not vote for Unity”) 
are only those who in the absence of NTV would have voted for Unity. Thus, the formula for 








!" ,                  (4) 
where ! is the vote share of parties opposed by NTV. As in the case of positive message, we 
estimate persuasion rate at t = t0 and ! = !0. As 
!!
!" we take the coefficient on NTV availability 
for the Unity vote (from the second column of Panel A in Table 2) multiplied by the inverse 
of the share of voters who watch NTV when it is available. Thus, the persuasion rate for the 
party opposed by NTV is equal 65.6 percent:   f =[15.48/0.37+*6.67/0.60]/0.81=65.6 percent. 
The persuasion rate of the negative message of NTV is much higher than the one found in 
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007). If we interpret the message of Fox News as a negative one 
(“do not vote for Democrats”), the persuasion rate for this message equals 14 percent.
32 
                                                 
31 For consistency, we are comparing our results to the persuasion rate in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) based 
on recall data, since our measure of NTV exposure is based on recall data as well. 





 (see the details in 
the online appendix). In the case where turnout does not change, this formula differs from the formula for the 
persuasion rate used in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) by the factor of 1/t.   26 
  The results indicate that the negative message of NTV (“do not vote for Unity”) was 
much more persuasive than the positive message (“vote for OVR or liberal parties”) as some 
potential voters for Unity decided not to come to the election booths and some turned to other 
parties (for which there was no difference in the content of different channels such as the 
communist KPRF). This result is consistent with the findings of the literature that negative 
political advertising is often more effective than positive.
33 Note also that from the theoretical 
point of view, the effect of political advertising should be smaller than the effect of biased 
news as long as journalists report the truth at least in some states of the world and viewers 
adjust to the incentives of the message sender (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; Gentzkow 
and Shapiro 2006; Knight and Chun-Fang Chiang 2009).  
As we discussed in section III, three political parties participated in both 1995 and 
1999 elections. These were liberal Yabloko, supported by NTV in 1999, KPRF (communists), 
and  LDPR  (nationalists),  towards  which  NTV  was  neutral.  In  addition,  in  1995,  another 
liberal party, Democratic Russia’s Choice, participated in the election; that party was the 
direct predecessor of SPS, and therefore, we can assume that these two parties actually were 
the  same  party.  For  these  four  parties,  we  can  use  difference-in-difference  approach  and 
estimate the effect of NTV, controlling for sub-region (rather than region) fixed effects using 
the following specification:  
,              (5) 
where t equals one of the two years: 1995 and 1999, j indexed the four parties that were 
present in both elections and the voter turnout, D1999 is a dummy for the year 1999, and "s are 
sub-region fixed effects. To account for serial autocorrelation, we cluster the error term at the 
sub-regional level. We code NTV availability to be equal to zero in all sub-regions in 1995, as 
                                                 
33 Recent experimental and survey evidence on political advertising implies higher persuasion rates of negative 
compared to positive messages (see, for instance, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and 
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the NTV audience at that time was negligible. NTV broadcasted only for a few hours per day 
with regional television companies having a priority over broadcasting on its frequency.
34 
(We do not include 2003 in the panel analysis as we do not have data on the location of NTV 
transmitters  in  2003.)  Thus,  #1  estimates  the  effect  of  the  differential  increase  in  NTV 
availability  on  the  election  results  from  1995  to  1999,  controlling  for  cross-sectional 
heterogeneity of sub-regions.  
Table 3 presents the results. Consistent with our main hypothesis, we find that NTV 
had a significant positive effect on the vote for the two liberal parties supported by NTV and 
no  significant  effect  on  turnout  or  on  the  vote  for  the  two  parties  which  were  similarly 
covered by NTV and the state channels. Qualitatively, the results of the panel and cross-
section estimations are consistent. The magnitude of the estimated effects on SPS increases 
from 3.5 to 6.5; while the effect for Yabloko decreases from 3.8 to 1.8. The difference in the 
size of the effects in part  is driven by differences in the sample size. In the panel estimation 
we do not need to control for socio-economic indicators available only for a subsample of 
sub-regions.
35 Since neither Unity nor OVR—the two parties that according to cross-sectional 
results were affected by NTV the most—were present at the time of 1995 elections, we cannot 
estimate the effect of NTV on these parties in panel analysis. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
B. Placebo experiment: checking the validity of the instrument 
The key identifying assumption in our baseline cross-sectional specification is that the 
availability of NTV, controlling for observable characteristics of sub-regions, is uncorrelated 
with the political preferences of voters other than through the effect of NTV. There are two 
                                                 
34 In 1995 in a representative survey of Russians, less than 6 percent of respondents said that NTV was their 
source of political information; in contrast, 77 percent and 25 percent of respondents made that claim about the 
two national channels, ORT and RTR (Colton, 2000). 
35 If we restrict the sample to those sub-regions that are included in the cross-section estimation, the effect on 
SPS equals 4.3 and the effect on Yabloko equals 2.2.   28 
potential reasons why this assumption may not hold. First, there might be reverse causality, as 
sub-regions with certain political preferences could be more likely to receive NTV. Second, 
there may have been some omitted characteristics of sub-regions that correlated both with the 
presence of the NTV signal and the political preferences of the population. For example, one 
could argue that our results are driven by the effect of the Soviet educational channel, whose 
infrastructure was inherited by NTV. If the educational channel had a lasting effect on the 
level of education and the political preferences of the electorate, NTV availability could just 
be a proxy for it.
36  
To test the validity of our main assumption, we conduct a placebo experiment. As in 
the panel regressions with sub-region fixed effects, we exploit the fact that NTV could not 
have a noticeable effect in 1995 because of the negligible audience. Table 4 reports the results 
of estimating the effect of NTV availability in 1999 on the voting results for all major parties 
and voter turnout in the 1995 parliamentary elections. We expect to find no effect of NTV 
availability for any of the parties as this is the only result consistent with no endogeneity 
problem in the baseline regressions. Panel A of Table 4 presents results for the liberal parties 
(Democratic  Russia’s  Choice  and  Yabloko),  whose  direct  heirs  (SPS  and  Yabloko)  were 
supported  by  NTV  in  1999.  Panel  B  presents  results  for  KPRF  (communist)  and  LDPR 
(nationalist). Finally, panel C presents the results for the main pro-government party from the 
1995 election (NDR) and voter turnout.
37 For each electoral outcome in Table 4, we present 
regressions with exactly the same specification as in table 2, but with electoral outcomes of 
                                                 
36 This, however, is unlikely as Channel 4 had very little viewership since its programs were “exceedingly 
boring” in the 1990s (Mickiewicz 1997, p. 171); and it was also true during the Soviet times (Mickiewicz 1988, 
p.9). 
37 If our results for SPS and Yabloko in 1999 were driven by unobserved heterogeneity between sub-regions, one 
would have expected positive significant coefficients on NTV availability for these parties. As there was no 
relative bias in coverage of KPRF and LDPR by NTV and state channels in 1999, the results for these parties in 
1999 either are an indirect effect of NTV persuasion or are driven by unobserved heterogeneity. In the latter 
case, we expect to find a positive effect on KPRF and a negative effect on LDPR. For the voter turnout, one 
would have expected a negative significant effect of NTV availability in 1999 if our baseline results were driven 
by endogeneity problems.   29 
1995 instead of 1999. The coefficients for NTV availability are much smaller in size and 
statistically insignificant for all the electoral outcomes in 1995.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
An  alternative  way  to  conduct  this  placebo  experiment  is  to  use  1995  electoral 
outcomes to predict 1999 electoral outcomes and test whether these predicted outcomes are 
affected by the availability of NTV in 1999. The results (not reported) are robust to using this 
alternative approach: we find no statistically significant relationship between the availability 
of NTV in 1999 and the voting outcomes in 1999 predicted by the vote in 1995. Summing up, 
the  results  of  the  placebo  experiment  are  consistent  with  the  premise  that  our  main 
identification assumption is valid. 
C. Persistence of NTV Effects 
In  order  to  examine  the  persistence  of  the  political  persuasion  of  the  media,  we 
estimate the effect of NTV availability in 1999 on voting results in the next parliamentary 
elections of 2003. In 2003, after NTV was taken over by the state monopoly Gazprom, there 
were  no  substantial  differences  between  news  coverage  of  NTV  and  other  national  TV 
channels for all parties participating in the election, with possibly one exception. Oates (2006, 
pp. 171-175) noted that the liberal SPS got slightly more time on NTV compared to ORT and 
RTR. If the effect of NTV is persistent, one would expect to see a significant effect of NTV 
availability in 1999 on the voting in 2003 for parties covered differently in 1999 and similarly 
in 2003. These results should become insignificant once we control for voting results of 1999. 
Yabloko was the party for which we would expect this kind of a pattern, as it participated in 
both elections; and in 2003, unlike 1999, NTV had similar coverage of this party to the other 
TV channels (Oates 2006, pp.171-173; Vladimir Gel’man 2005, p. 240). As there may have   30 
been  some  small  differences  in  coverage  of  SPS  in  2003,  one  may  expect  to  see  some 
incremental effect of NTV even after controlling for the voting results of 1999.  
As  far  as  the  other  parties  that  participated  in  2003  elections  are  concerned,  the 
prediction is less clear-cut. KPRF (communists) and LDPR (nationalists) were only indirectly 
affected by NTV in 1999 and it is not clear whether such an effect should be persistent. OVR 
formed an alliance with Unity and they participated in 2003 parliamentary elections as a 
single party, United Russia. Since in 1999 NTV was supporting OVR and opposing Unity, the 
effect of NTV on the vote for United Russia in 2003 is ambiguous even if it is long-term. 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the effect of NTV availability in 1999 on the 
voting results in 2003. For each electoral outcome, we present results of three regressions: 
first, the specification identical to our baseline, i.e., controlling for 1995 election results; then, 
without  any  electoral  controls,  and  third,  with  1999  election  results  as  controls.  Panel  A 
presents the results for SPS and Yabloko; panel B for KPRF and LDPR; and panel C for 
United  Russia  and  voter  turnout.  We  find  a  positive  and  significant  effect  of  the  NTV 
availability in 1999 on the vote for the liberal parties SPS and Yabloko and negative and 
significant effect on the voter turnout in 2003 (both with and without electoral controls from 
1995). The magnitude of the effects for the vote in 2003 for each of the two liberal parties is 
about  one  half  of  that  in  1999  and  is  similar  for  the  voter  turnout.  The  effect  of  NTV 
availability  drops  in  magnitude  and  becomes  statistically  insignificant  for  Yabloko  and 
turnout once we control for the voting results in 1999. In contrast, the vote for SPS is positive 
and marginally significant, albeit much smaller, even after controlling for the election results 
of 1999. We also find that votes for KPRF, LDPR and United Russia in 2003 were not 
significantly affected by NTV. The results of our analysis of the 2003 electoral outcomes are 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  NTV  had  a  long-term  persuasion  effect  on  voting  for 
liberal parties and on the decisions to participate in elections.   31 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Overall, our findings at the aggregate level data can be summarized as follows: The 
presence of NTV signal had a robust significant effect on the vote for the parties that were 
covered differently by NTV and the two state channels. Persuasion rates are much bigger for 
the negative message conveyed by NTV (“do not vote for Unity”) as compared to the positive 
message (“vote for parties supported by NTV”). NTV’s persuasion effect is persistent; it was 
present three years after the takeover of NTV.  
IV. Individual-level results 
A. Benchmark results. 
The  analysis  of  individual-level  data  adds  to  the  aggregate-level  results  in  the 
following important respects: First, it allows us to estimate the persuasion effect of NTV 
controlling for individual characteristics. For example, we were not able to control for the 
level of education of voters in the aggregate-level analysis as there are no such data for sub-
regions, but we can do so at the individual level. Second, since the survey was conducted both 
before and after the elections it gives us an opportunity to examine in more detail which 
groups of voters get more easily persuaded by the media.  
Using survey data we estimate the effect of whether the respondent watched NTV in 
1999 on which party the respondent voted for in the 1999 election. Both the information on 
watching NTV and information on voting are self-reported by the respondent. Since self-
reported measure of media exposure is subject to significant reporting biases and may be 
endogenous to vote choice (Vincent Price and John Zaller 1993; Markus Prior 2009), one 
cannot  consistently  estimate  the  effect  of  watching  NTV  without  a  source  of  exogenous 
variation. To cope with this problem, we instrument the reported exposure to NTV programs   32 
by our measure of predicted NTV signal strength (which we derived using information on the 
power and the location of transmitters).  
In  particular,  we  estimate  bivariate  probit  regression  model  with  the  following 
structural equation of interest: 
!! !!"#!!!"""
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!      (6) 
where  i  indexes  individual  respondents  and  j  indexes  parties.  Dummy  variable  vote
j
i,1999 
equals 1 if respondent i reported voting for party j and zero if the respondent reported voting 
for some other party. Watched_NTVi,1999 equals 1 if the respondent i reported watching  news 
programs on NTV in 1999 and zero otherwise. Ci,1999 is a set of individual and sub-regional 
level characteristics.
38 In the first-stage equation, Watched_NTVi,1999  is instrumented by the 
predicted NTV signal strength in 1999 in the home sub-region of individual i. The error term 
is clustered at the sub-regional level. 
Table 6 presents the results of the first stage regressions for two specifications: on the 
full sample with the baseline set of controls and on the sample of respondents who had well-
defined  voting  intentions  one  month  before  the  1999  election  controlling  for  the  voting 
intentions. In both specifications, predicted NTV signal strength is a strong predictor of the 
respondents’ exposure to NTV programs (F-statistics for the excluded instrument are 29.7 in 
the  baseline  and  13.6  with  the  controls  for  voting  intentions  just  one  month  prior  to  the 
election).  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 presents the results of the second stage regressions. The four panels of the 
table are organized in the same way as Table 2. For each dependent variable (dummy for 
                                                 
38  Individual  social  and  demographic  characteristics  include:  gender,  age,  marital  status,  dummy  for  ethnic 
Russian, education (dummy for college education or higher), religiosity (answer to the question: Do you attend 
regularly religious services?), dummy for former membership in Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
and a consumption index. We follow Colton and McFaul (2003) to construct the consumption index as a sum of 
the answers to the following questions: “Do you own: A car? A dacha (summer home)? A computer? A phone? 
An automatic washing machine? Do you have Internet access? Have you ever been abroad?” We also control for 
the logarithms of sub-regional population and average wage and for the city dummy.    33 
whether the respondent reported voting for a particular party or showing up for election), we 
report coefficients from the IV probit and probit regressions along with their marginal effects. 
The coefficients on our main variable of interest, Watched_NTVi,1999, in the second stage are 
the estimates of the causal effect of watching NTV. It had a significant negative effect on the 
reported vote for the pro-government party Unity opposed by NTV and a significant positive 
effect  on the reported vote for the two out of three parties supported by NTV, namely, 
centrist OVR and liberal SPS. The effect on Yabloko (the other liberal party supported by 
NTV)  is  positive,  but  small  in  magnitude  and  statistically  insignificant.  We  find  no 
relationship in the individual-level data between watching NTV and self-reported turnout or 
voting  for  the  two  parties  with  similar  coverage  by  NTV  and  the  state  TV,  i.e.,  KPRF 
(communist) and LDPR (nationalist). The magnitude of the estimated effects is substantial: 
marginal effects imply that survey respondents who watched NTV were 40 percentage points 
less  likely  to  vote  for  Unity,  20  percentage  points  more  likely  to  vote  for  OVR,  and  23 
percentage points more likely to vote for SPS. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
To calculate persuasion rates for individual-level results we use formulas (2) and (3), 
where  as 
!!
!"  we  use  the  estimated  marginal  effects.  To  predict  voting  results  in  the 
counterfactual scenario of zero NTV availability in all sub-regions, we use the estimated 
equation (2) and calculate for each individual predicted probability of voting for a given party 
with Watched_NTVi,1999 set to zero. The predicted share of votes in the counterfactual scenario 
without NTV is as follows: Unity would have gotten 47.0 percent of the total vote (instead of 
28 percent), parties supported by NTV would have received 9.4 percent of the total vote 
(instead of 25 percent), and the turnout would remain 81 percent. The resulting persuasion 
rate of the positive message (“vote for OVR or liberal parties”) equals 44.6 percent, whereas   34 
the persuasion rate of the negative message of NTV (“do not vote for Unity”) equals 47.9 
percent.
39 
Overall, our main hypothesis is supported by the individual-level results: we do find 
that NTV had strong persuasion powers as it affected the propensity to vote for Unity, OVR 
and SPS. In survey data, however, we find that the effect of watching NTV on the reported 
vote for the liberal Yabloko is not statistically significant in contrast to the aggregate-level 
results (but the point estimate has the right sign). In addition, in survey data we find no effect 
on reported turnout; yet this may be the case because respondents might not be willing to 
reveal their political apathy by admitting that they did not turn up for election. The individual-
level results are robust to using a reduced-form probit model with NTV availability in 1999 as 
a measure of NTV exposure (defined in the same way as in the aggregate-level analysis). 
Statistical significance of the results remains unchanged; the magnitude of marginal effects 
for Unity and SPS is very similar, while marginal effects for OVR increases to 27 percentage 
points. As in the case of the aggregate-level analysis, we test the validity of our identification 
assumption  with  placebo  regressions  and  find  no  effect  of  NTV  on  voting  choices  of 
individuals in 1995 (the results are presented in the online appendix). 
B. Who gets persuaded? 
So  far  we  have  analyzed  survey  responses  about  voting  choices  right  after  the 
elections. One month prior to the 1999 election, there was another round of the survey in 
which the same respondents were asked about their intentions to vote. Using this information, 
we can estimate the effect of watching election campaign on NTV for a month right before 
election on voting decisions by controlling for the intention to vote one month prior to the 
election. We can also estimate the effect of NTV on the undecided voters (i.e., those voters 
                                                 
39 In the online Appendix we compare the magnitudes of the effects estimated using individual and aggregate-
level data.    35 
who did not answer which party they were going to vote for in the pre-election survey but 
answered which party they voted for in the post-election survey) as well as on the intention to 
vote for a particular party one month before election. Table 8 presents the results. For each 
political party, we present results of three regressions. Two regressions are on the subsample 
of voters who had well-defined voting intentions: with the actual reported vote in the post-
election survey as the dependent variable controlling for which party the respondent intended 
to vote for one month prior to the election; and for reported intention to vote in the pre-
election survey as dependent variable. The third regression is for the reported vote on the 
subsample of undecided voters. After we control for voters’ intention to vote for a particular 
party just a month before the election, the exposure to NTV made people 30 percentage points 
more likely to vote for OVR, the main opposition party supported by NTV (albeit only the 
coefficient is significant and not the marginal effect), 46 percentage points more likely to vote 
for SPS, one of the two liberal parties supported by NTV. It also made people 50 percentage 
points less likely to vote for KPRF (communist party) and 25 percentage points less likely to 
vote for LDPR (nationalists). The effect of NTV on pro-government Unity as well as on other 
parties is insignificant once we control for voting intentions. Thus, watching the coverage of 
the intensive election campaign for one month before the election persuaded voters to switch 
their  political  orientation  towards  OVR  and  SPS  (and  away  from  KPRF  and  LDPR).  In 
addition, watching NTV had a large effect on the intention to vote for OVR a month before 
the election (37 percentage points) and for Yabloko (32 percentage points; although, in the 
case of intention to vote for Yabloko, only the coefficient is significant and not the marginal 
effect).    Again,  we  find  no  significant  effect  of  NTV  on  intention  to  vote  for  Unity.  In 
contrast, the largest effect among undecided voters is on Unity: watching NTV for a month 
before election made undecided people 49 percentage points less likely to vote for Unity. 
Overall, we can conclude that TV matters for voting decisions even in the very short run.   36 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
We  also  tried  to  explore  whether  the  persuasion  power  of  the  media  depends  on 
individual characteristics of respondents, such as income, education, and age. We did not find 
robust evidence that any of these individual characteristics make people more or less easily 
persuaded by the media.
40  
V. Conclusions 
We  document  the  effects  of  media  on  voting  outcomes  in  Russia’s  parliamentary 
elections of 1999. We base our identification on the variation in the geographical availability 
of NTV, the only major TV channel that was independent from the government at that time. 
This allows us to estimate the causal effect of exposure to media on voting behavior and to 
avoid endogeneity biases inherent in survey-based studies. At the aggregate level of analysis, 
we  find  that  the  effect  of  NTV  availability  was  positive  and  significant  for  the  three 
opposition parties supported by NTV and negative and significant for the pro-government 
party  opposed  by  NTV.  Raising  the  predicted  NTV  availability  by  ten  percentage  points 
increases the vote for these parties by 1.1 percentage points and decreases the vote for pro-
government Unity party by 1.55 percentage points. In addition, it leads to a decline in turnout 
of about 0.67 percentage points. These results imply that in our sample the government party 
lost about a quarter of its voters and the opposition parties increased their political support by 
about 60 percent as a result of NTV broadcasts. The analysis of the persuasion rates indicates 
that about 8 percent  of people who watched NTV were persuaded to vote for the three 
opposition parties, which is similar to findings in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007). However, 
66  percent  of  the  potential  pro-governmental  party  supporters  who  watched  NTV  were 
persuaded not to vote for it, which is substantially higher than persuasion rates found in the 
                                                 
40 If we use the presence of NTV transmitter in the sub-region as a measure of NTV availability, the effect of 
persuasion is less pronounced for people with higher political knowledge and people with access to alternative 
sources of information. The results are available in the working paper version of this work.   37 
previous literature. NTV had large persuasion effects despite some presence of diversity of 
opinions on the radio and in print media. Our findings imply that the absence of independent 
TV may not be fully compensated by other media, and, therefore, television may need to be 
considered a separate market for the purposes of regulation. 
Using survey data, we find that even controlling for the voting intentions just a month 
before the elections, NTV had a substantial effect on the vote for the major opposition party 
supported by NTV. Thus, NTV was able to persuade its viewers to vote for this party despite 
their  initial  voting  intentions  just  before  the  elections.  We  also  find  that  NTV  prevented 
undecided voters from voting for the pro-government party criticized by NTV.  
Our results suggest that the media possesses a substantial power of political persuasion 
in countries characterized by weak democratic institutions such as Russia. By comparing our 
results with other findings in the literature, we conclude that the power of political persuasion 
of the media can be much larger in environments with weak democratic institutions than in 
established democracies. It would be too quick, however, to conclude that it is the case in any 
imperfect democracy or any other country at a similar stage of institutional development. 
Media effects in Russia are large due to the combination of such factors as the unstable party 
system, weak partisan attachments, the lack of prior information about the performance of 
politicians in office, unclear policy positions, the importance of candidates' individual traits, 
and the lack of competitiveness in the media market. We expect media effects to be large in 
countries with all these conditions in place. Further research is needed to estimate the relative 
importance of these conditions and the magnitudes of media effects in other countries.   38 
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Table 1. Correlates of the location of NTV transmitter in 1999 
  NTV Transmitter in 1999 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Determinants of transmitter location             
City dummy, 1998  0.1562  0.0633    0.0484  0.0496  0.04 
  [0.0271]***  [0.0317]**    [0.0370]  [0.0372]  [0.0234]* 
Population, 1998  0.001           
  [0.0001]***           
Average wage, 1998  0.0732           
  [0.0335]**           
Fifth-order polynomial of log population, 1998    Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
       (F-statistic, population polynomial)     (24.49)***     (25.05)***   (24.83)***   (9.69)***  
Fifth-order polynomial of log average wage, 1998    Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
       (F-statistic, wage polynomial)     (10.65)***     (3.12)**  (3.03)**  (5.3)***  
Election results, 1995             
Vote for NDR (Pro-government) in 1995,  
percent 
 
  0.0014  -0.0012  -0.0015  -0.0005 
      [0.0013]  [0.0014]  [0.0014]  [0.0012] 
Democratic Russia's Choice (Liberal),  percent      0.0099  -0.0038  -0.0043  -0.0022 
      [0.0110]  [0.0026]  [0.0026]*  [0.0016] 
Vote for Yabloko (Liberal) in 1995,  percent      0.035  -0.0062  -0.0082  -0.0075 
      [0.0089]***  [0.0098]  [0.0099]  [0.0057] 
Vote for KPRF (Communist) in 1995,  percent      -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0008 
      [0.0015]  [0.0016]  [0.0015]  [0.0009] 
Vote for LDPR (Nationalist) in 1995,  percent      -0.001  -0.0023  -0.0025  -0.0016 
      [0.0028]  [0.0025]  [0.0025]  [0.0020] 
Voter turnout in 1995,  percent      -0.0084  -0.0004  -0.0002  0.0001 
      [0.0018]***  [0.0020]  [0.0020]  [0.0016] 
Socio-economic characteristics, 1998             
Doctors per 1000, 1998          0.0016  -0.00002 
          [0.0012]  [0.0008] 
Nurses per 1000, 1998          -0.0005  -0.0003 
          [0.0004]  [0.0002] 
Population change, 1998          -0.0076  -0.0014 
          [0.0048]  [0.0017] 
Migration rate, 1998          0.0082  -0.0017 
          [0.0096]  [0.0074] 
Fraction of retired people, 1998          -0.0012  -0.0009 
          [0.0019]  [0.0010] 
Fraction of unemployed, 1998          0.0078  -0.0011 
          [0.0076]  [0.0045] 
Fraction of population employed in farms, 1998          0.0073  -0.0035 
          [0.0061]  [0.0021] 
Crime rate, 1998          0.0001  0.0001 
          [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
NTV Transmitter in 1997            0.7227 
            [0.0342]*** 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2058  2058  1948  1727  1723  1723 
R-squared  0.34  0.38  0.29  0.39  0.39  0.71 
F-statistic, Determinants of transmitter location  (87.78)***  (38.7)***     (10.58)***   (10.51)***   (5.62)***  
F-statistic, Election results variables      (23.54)***  (0.86)  (1.29)  (0.63) 
F-statistic, Socio-economic characteristics          (1.15)  (1.19) 
Robust standard errors in brackets. F-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent.   45 
Table 2. Effect of NTV availability on voting behavior in 1999, aggregate data, cross-section 
Panel A  Opposed by NTV in 1999  Supported by NTV in 1999 
  Vote for Unity in 1999 
(centrist, pro-government) 
Vote for OVR in 1999 
(centrist, opposition) 
NTV Availability in 1999  -17.72  -15.48  5.72  3.62 
  [2.51]***  [2.77]***  [1.95]***  [1.72]** 
Electoral controls from 1995  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Socio-economic controls 1998  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2005  1686  2005  1686 
Number of regions  81  79  81  79 
R-squared  0.67  0.66  0.79  0.82 
         
Panel B  Supported by NTV in 1999 
  Vote for SPS in 1999 
(liberal) 
Vote for  Yabloko in 1999 
(liberal) 
NTV Availability in 1999  4.47  3.52  4.58  3.85 
  [1.07]***  [1.15]***  [0.84]***  [0.67]*** 
Electoral controls from 1995  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Socio-economic controls 1998  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2005  1686  2005  1686 
Number of regions  81  79  81  79 
R-squared  0.78  0.82  0.78  0.84 
         
Panel C  Similar coverage by NTV and state TV in 1999 
  Vote for KPRF in 1999 
(communist) 
Vote for LDPR in 1999 
(nationalist) 
NTV Availability in 1999  1.68  3.92  -1.72  -1.39 
  [2.03]  [1.86]**  [0.66]**  [0.61]** 
Electoral controls from 1995  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Socio-economic controls 1998  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2005  1686  2005  1686 
Number of regions  81  79  81  79 
R-squared  0.74  0.81  0.70  0.73 
         
Panel D  Voter turnout in 1999   
NTV Availability in 1999  -6.54  -6.67     
  [1.94]***  [1.42]***     
Electoral controls from 1995  No  Yes     
Socio-economic controls 1998  Yes  Yes     
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes     
Observations  2005  1686     
Number of regions  81  79     
R-squared  0.71  0.81     
All dependent variables are measured in percentages of total vote. Electoral controls include the results of Duma 
elections in December 1995, in particular vote for KPRF (Communists), vote for Yabloko, vote for NDR (Our Home is 
Russia), vote for LDPR (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia), vote for Democratic Russia’s Choice, and voter turnout. 
The set of socio-economic controls includes fifth order polynomial of population, fifth order polynomial of average 
wage,  number  of  nurses  per  capita,  number  of  doctors  per  capita,  and  dummy  for  cities.  Robust  standard  errors 
adjusted for clusters by region in brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent.   46 
Table 3. Effect of NTV availability on voting behavior, aggregate panel data 
  Supported by NTV in 1999  Similar coverage by NTV and 
state TV in 1999   
 






Vote for  
Yabloko 
(liberal) 






NTV Availability   6.65  1.84  -2.2  1.18  -2.06 
  [1.40]***  [0.76]**  [2.12]  [1.38]  [2.01] 
Year dummy for 1999  -0.54  -1.42  3.72  -7.09  -10.82 
  [0.83]  [0.44]***  [1.24]***  [0.82]***  [1.19]*** 
Constant  1.94  3.61  25.39  13.48  68.85 
  [0.06]***  [0.03]***  [0.11]***  [0.06]***  [0.09]*** 
Sub-region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4240  4240  4240  4240  4240 
Number of sub-regions  2302  2302  2302  2302  2302 
R-squared  0.35  0.03  0.07  0.61  0.72 
All dependent variables are measured in percentages of total vote. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by sub-region in 
brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 4. Placebo regressions for the elections of 1995, aggregate data, cross-section 
  Supported by NTV in 1999  Similar coverage by NTV and 
state TV in 1999 
   





Choice in 1995 
(liberal) 





KPRF in 1995 
(communist) 
Vote for 
LDPR in 1995 
(nationalist) 





NTV Availability in 1999  0.60  1.06  -2.33  -2.85  0.12  -3.94 
  [0.37]  [0.83]  [3.44]  [1.71]  [1.61]  [2.67] 
Socio-economic controls 
from 1998 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1686  1686  1686  1686  1686  1686 
Number of regions  79  79  79  79  79  79 
R-squared  0.73  0.79  0.73  0.60  0.62  0.67 
All dependent variables are measured in percentages of total vote. The set of socio-economic controls includes fifth order polynomial of 
population, fifth order polynomial of average wage, number of nurses per capita, number of doctors per capita, and dummy for cities. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by region in brackets.  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 
1 percent. 
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Table 5. Long-term effect of NTV for the elections of 2003, aggregate data 
Panel A  Supported by NTV in 1999; more time 
allocated on NTV in 2003 
Supported by NTV in 1999; similar 
coverage by NTV and state TV in 
2003  
  Vote for SPS in 2003 
(liberal) 
Vote for Yabloko in 2003 
(liberal) 
NTV Availability in 1999  1.79  2.18  1.06  1.75  2.13  0.38 
  [0.48]***  [0.53]***  [0.57]*  [0.35]***  [0.43]***  [0.30] 
Electoral controls from 1995  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Electoral controls from 1999  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Socio-economic controls from 1998  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1662  1662  1662  1662  1662  1662 
Number of regions  79  79  79  79  79  79 
R-squared  0.71  0.67  0.71  0.84  0.79  0.86 
             
Panel B  Similar coverage by NTV and state TV in 1999 and 2003 
  Vote for KPRF in 2003 
(communist) 
Vote for LDPR in 2003 
(nationalist) 
NTV Availability in 1999  -0.71  -1.55  -1.99  -0.5  -0.89  1.42 
  [1.66]  [1.84]  [1.55]  [1.09]  [1.24]  [1.00] 
Electoral controls from 1995  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Electoral controls from 1999  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Socio-economic controls from 1998  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1662  1662  1662  1662  1662  1662 
Number of regions  79  79  79  79  79  79 
R-squared  0.70  0.63  0.76  0.73  0.68  0.79 
             
Panel C  Similar coverage by NTV and state TV 
in 2003 
 
  Vote for United Russia in 2003 
(pro-government, centrist, formed as 
an alliance of OVR and Unity) 
Voter turnout in 2003 
NTV Availability in 1999  -2.95  -3.2  0.28  -6.72  -8.76  -2.88 
  [3.15]  [3.23]  [3.11]  [2.76]**  [3.45]**  [2.65] 
Electoral controls from 1995  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Electoral controls from 1999  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Socio-economic controls from 1998  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1662  1662  1662  1662  1662  1662 
Number of regions  79  79  79  79  79  79 
R-squared  0.76  0.73  0.79  0.79  0.72  0.82 
All  dependent  variables  are  measured  in  percentages  of  total  vote.  Electoral  controls  from  1995  include  vote  for  KPRF 
(Communists), vote for Yabloko, vote for NDR (Our Home is Russia),  vote for LDPR (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia),  vote 
for DVR (Democratic Russia’s Choice), voter turnout. Electoral controls from 1999 include vote for Unity, vote for OVR, vote for 
KPRF,  vote  for  SPS,  Yabloko,  vote  for  LDPR,    and  voter  turnout.    The  set  of  socio-economic  controls  includes  fifth  order 
polynomial of population, fifth order polynomial of average wage, number of nurses per capita, number of doctors per capita, and 
dummy for cities. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by region in brackets.  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 6. Individual-level results, the first stage estimation 
  Watched NTV in 1999 (self-reported) 
  OLS  Probit  OLS  Probit 
NTV signal power in 1999  0.003  0.007  0.002  0.006 
  [0.000]***  [0.001]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]*** 
Gender (1 if male)  0.068  0.218  0.036  0.122 
  [0.035]*  [0.105]**  [0.044]  [0.125] 
Age  -0.002  -0.007  -0.002  -0.006 
  [0.001]**  [0.003]**  [0.001]  [0.004] 
Finished high school  0.074  0.195  0.103  0.272 
  [0.048]  [0.135]  [0.056]*  [0.155]* 
Marital status (1 if married)  0.03  0.081  0.037  0.099 
  [0.037]  [0.107]  [0.045]  [0.126] 
Consumption index  0.026  0.084  0.029  0.088 
  [0.013]**  [0.040]**  [0.015]*  [0.046]* 
Ln (population), 1998  -0.058  -0.202  -0.069  -0.221 
  [0.016]***  [0.053]***  [0.020]***  [0.065]*** 
Ln (Average wage), 1998  0.161  0.584  0.218  0.726 
  [0.046]***  [0.168]***  [0.060]***  [0.217]*** 
Intention to vote for Unity in 1999      0.08  0.222 
      [0.072]  [0.201] 
Intention to vote for OVR in 1999      0.057  0.141 
      [0.073]  [0.205] 
Intention to vote for SPS in 1999      0.103  0.289 
      [0.085]  [0.249] 
Intention to vote for Yabloko in 1999      0.074  0.209 
      [0.076]  [0.222] 
Intention to vote for KPRF in 1999      0.115  0.331 
      [0.058]**  [0.162]** 
Intention to vote for LDPR in 1999      0.045  0.104 
      [0.118]  [0.318] 
Observations  901  901  656  656 
R-squared  0.13    0.11   
F-statistics  for the exclusion of NTV1999  29.65    13.60   
!2 statistics for the exclusion of NTV1999    29.9    13.85 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant 
at 1 percent.  Availability of NTV alone explains 7 percent of variation in NTV exposure. Survey weights 
are applied. 
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Table 7. Self-reported vote and NTV in 1999, survey data 
Panel A  Opposed by NTV in 1999  Supported by NTV in 1999 
  Vote for Unity in 1999 
(centrist, pro-government) 
Vote for OVR in 1999 
(centrist, opposition) 
  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit 
Watched NTV in 1999  -0.831  -0.139  1.180  0.135 
  [0.301]***  [0.128]  [0.477]**  [0.156] 
Marginal effect  -0.26  -0.05  0.25  0.02 
  [0.09]***  [0.04]  [0.14]*  [0.02] 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  901  901  901  901 
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42  42 
!2 statistics for the exclusion of  
NTV1999 in the first stage 
34.72    24.79   
         
Panel B  Supported by NTV in 1999 
  Vote for SPS in 1999 
(liberal) 
Vote for  Yabloko in 1999 
(liberal) 
  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit 
Watched NTV in 1999  1.210  0.272  0.467  0.039 
  [0.405] ***  [0.149]*  [0.555]  [0.178] 
Marginal effect  0.24  0.04  0.06  0.004 
  [0.11]**  [0.02]*  [0.08]  [0.02] 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  901  901  901  901 
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42  42 
!2 statistics for the exclusion of  




         
Panel C  Similar coverage by NTV and state TV channels in 1999 
  Vote for KPRF in 1999 
(communist) 
Vote for LDPR in 1999 
(nationalist) 
  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit 
Watched NTV in 1999  -0.296  0.052  -0.266  -0.10 
  [0.351]  [0.111]  [0.764]  [0.140] 
Marginal effect  -0.09  0.02  -0.02  -0.01 
  [0.11]  [0.04]  [0.07]  [0.01] 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  901  901  901  901 
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42  42 
!2 statistics for the exclusion of  




         
Panel D  Voter turnout   
  IV probit  Probit     
Watched NTV in 1999  0.219  0.102     
  [0.337]  [0.115]     
Marginal effect  0.06  0.03     
  [0.08]  [0.03]     
Controls  Yes  Yes     
Observations  1,148  1148     
Number of sub-regions  42  42     
!2 statistics for the exclusion of  
NTV1999 in the first stage  35.39       
Bivariate probit model is used in the IV regressions with “Watched NTV” variable from the pre-election survey 
instrumented by the measure of NTV signal power. Observations are weighted by sample survey weights. Vector of 
controls includes dummy variables for gender, age, marital status, education, consumption index, logarithms of sub-
regional  population,  and  average  wage.  Robust  standard  errors  adjusted  for  clusters  by  sub-region  in  brackets. 
*significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Survey weights are applied. 
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Table 8. Intention to vote and vote in 1999 
Panel A  Opposed by NTV in 1999  Supported by NTV in 1999 
  Unity in 1999 (pro-government)  OVR in 1999 (centrist, opposition) 
Subsample  Excluding undecided  Undecided only  Excluding undecided  Undecided only 
Depended variable  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote 
Watched NTV in 1999  -0.631  0.073  -1.391  1.713  1.508  0.081 
  [0.724]  [0.698]  [0.605]**  [0.133]***  [0.171]***  [0.987] 
Marginal effect  -0.17  0.01  -0.42  0.37  0.41  0.01 
  [0.19]  [0.13]  [0.15]***  [0.03]***  [0.05]***  [0.15] 
Intention to vote  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  656  786  245  656  786  245 
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42  42  42  42 
"2 statistics for exclusion of NTV  15.23  14.64  15.40  7.219  17.23  22.05 
Panel B  Supported by NTV in 1999 
  SPS in 1999 (liberal)  Yabloko in 1999 (liberal) 
Subsample  Excluding undecided  Undecided only  Excluding undecided  Undecided only 
Depended variable  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote 
Watched NTV in 1999  1.808  -0.329  1.033  -0.164  1.103  1.040 
  [0.161]***  [0.472]  [0.389]***  [0.856]  [0.316]***  [0.644] 
Marginal effect  0.28  -0.05  0.17  -0.01  0.24  0.14 
  [0.03]***  [0.07]  [0.09]**  [0.06]  [0.10]**  [0.12] 
Intention to vote  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  656  786  245  656  786  245 
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42  42  42  42 
"2 statistics for exclusion of NTV  12.35  15.11  20.20  13.45  16.68  20.04 
Panel C  Similar coverage by NTV and state TV channels in 1999 
  KPRF in 1999 (communist)  LDPR in 1999 (nationalist) 
Subsample  Excluding undecided  Undecided only  Excluding undecided  Undecided only 
Depended variable  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote 
Watched NTV in 1999  -0.746  -0.713  0.804  -0.584  -0.347  1.075 
  [0.412]*  [0.874]  [0.757]  [1.020]  [0.794]  [0.796] 
Marginal effect  -0.16  -0.22  0.21  -0.04  -0.03  0.13 
  [0.10]  [0.26]  0.20  [0.10]  [0.08]  [0.17] 
Intention to vote  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  656  786  245  656  786  245 
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42  42  42  42 
"2 statistics for exclusion of NTV  15.04  9.040  22.68  14.11  14.33  22.49 
Panel D  Voter turnout in 1999         
Subsample  Excluding undecided  Undecided only       
Depended variable  Reported Vote  Intention  Reported Vote       
Watched NTV in 1999  -0.609  0.313  0.378       
  [0.525]  [0.449]  [0.453]       
Marginal effect  -0.12  0.05  0.13       
  [0.12]  [0.08]  [0.15]       
Intention to vote  Yes  No  No       
Observations  764  1,105  384       
Number of sub-regions  42  42  42       
!2 statistics for exclusion of NTV  15.33  30.86  23.27         
Bivariate probit model. Watched NTV variable form the post-election survey instrumented by the measure of NTV signal power. In columns marked 
“Undecided only” only respondents that did not report their intention to vote in the pre-election survey are included in the sample. Observations are 
weighted  by  sample  survey  weights.  All  specifications  include  the  following  vector  of  controls  includes  gender,  age,  marital  status,  education, 
consumption index, logarithm of sub-regional population and wage. Controls for intention to vote include dummy variables for intention to vote for 6  
major parties.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by sub-region in brackets.  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. Survey weights are applied. 
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Table A1. Summary statistics. Intention to vote and reported vote, 
December 1999 Duma elections 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Watches NTV  1148  0.61  0.49 
NTV available  1148  0.73  0.44 
Intention to vote for OVR (centrist, opposition)  764  0.13  0.34 
Intention to vote for Unity (centrist, pro-government)  764  0.11  0.32 
Intention to vote for SPS  (liberal)  764  0.07  0.26 
Intention to vote for Yabloko  (liberal)  764  0.11  0.31 
Intention to vote for KPRF  (communist)  764  0.31  0.46 
Intention to vote for LDPR (nationalist)  764  0.04  0.21 
Intended to participate in elections  1069  0.91  0.29 
Vote for Unity (centrist, pro-government)  901  0.28  0.45 
Vote for OVR (centrist, opposition)  901  0.09  0.28 
Vote for SPS (liberal)  901  0.10  0.31 
Vote for Yabloko (liberal)  901  0.06  0.24 
Vote for KPRF (communist)  901  0.31  0.46 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist)  901  0.04  0.20 
Turnout   1148  0.81  0.39 
Male  1148  0.40  0.49 
Age  1148  29.04  16.56 
Finished high school  1148  0.80  0.40 
Married  1148  0.67  0.47 
Consumption index  1148  1.56  1.35 
Political knowledge  1148  6.87  2.49 
Reads newspapers  1148  0.31  0.46 
Listens to radio  1148  0.37  0.48 
Survey weights are applied.   Table A2. Summary statistics, socio-economic characteristics of sub-regions 
  Low Availability of 
NTV 
High Availability of 
NTV 
  Official 
Results of 
Elections 




  Socio-economic characteristics   
Population, thousands  31.24  41.75  1146  74.04  149.05  1146  [0.000]***   
Population change  -0.34  2.52  1028  -0.25  2.19  1053  [0.412]   
Migration rate, %  -0.28  1.46  1028  0.22  0.87  1053  [0.000]***   
Average wage,  thousands of rubles  846.45  643.54  1031  806.95  535.22  1055  [0.000]***   
Average pension,  thousands of rubles  405.91  79.13  955  393.52  48.22  965  [0.128]   
Retired , %  25.13  9.81  1026  25.76  11.33  1051  [0.179]   
Unemployed, %  2.03  1.99  1028  1.55  1.48  1053  [0.000]***   
Population employed in farms, %  0.23  1.46  1028  0.26  1.71  1053  [0.665]   
Crime rate, per 10000  148.55  176.93  1028  179.16  248.16  1053  [0.001]***   
  Vote in parliamentary elections in Duma, 1995   
Vote for NDR (pro-government), %  8.31  8.98  947  8.53  7.32  991  [0.554]  10.13 
Democratic Russia's Choice (liberal), %  1.60  2.58  947  2.16  2.90  991  [0.000]***  3.86 
Vote for Yabloko (liberal), %  2.86  2.48  947  4.19  3.51  991  [0.000]***  6.89 
Vote for KPRF (communist), %  24.98  11.20  947  26.57  12.48  991  [0.003]***  22.30 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist), %  14.03  6.53  947  12.92  5.91  991  [0.000]***  11.18 
Voter turnout, %  70.46  8.80  947  67.53  8.47  991  [0.000]***  64.38 
  Vote in parliamentary elections in Duma, 1999   
Vote for Unity (centrist, pro-government), %  30.44  11.04  1146  25.61  10.65  1146  [0.000]***  23.32 
Vote for OVR (centrist, opposition), %  9.45  14.99  1146  10.48  12.96  1146  [0.077]*  13.33 
Vote for SPS (liberal), %  4.51  4.09  1146  6.02  4.01  1146  [0.000]***  8.52 
Vote for Yabloko (liberal), %  2.45  2.01  1146  4.13  3.13  1146  [0.000]***  5.93 
Vote for KPRF (communist), %  27.12  10.50  1146  28.01  10.79  1146  [0.046]**  24.29 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist), %  7.50  3.30  1146  6.68  2.68  1146  [0.000]***  5.98 
Voter turnout, %  58.34  10.28  1146  55.14  9.39  1146  [0.000]***  61.85 
  Vote in parliamentary elections in Duma, 2003   
Vote for United Russia (centrist, pro-
government), %  41.98  13.79  1148  39.42  13.27  1322  [0.017]**  37.57 
Vote for SPS (Liberal), %  2.15  2.67  1148  3.09  2.79  1322  [0.000]***  3.97 
Vote for Yabloko (Liberal), %  1.90  1.36  1148  3.28  2.41  1322  [0.000]***  4.30 
Vote for KPRF (communist), %  14.08  5.91  1148  13.52  5.18  1322  [0.025]**  12.61 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist), %  12.53  5.14  1148  12.07  4.21  1322  [0.040]**  11.45 
Voter turnout, %  61.65  12.37  1148  56.94  11.51  1322  [0.000]***  55.75 
  
Figure A1. Predicted probability that NTV is available in 1999 by sub-region and the location of NTV transmitters. 
White areas indicate missing election data. 
    
Figure A2. Vote for Unity (pro-government party opposed by NTV) by sub-regions, Russian parliamentary elections, 1999. White areas indicate missing election data.  
  
Figure A3. Vote for OVR (centrist opposition party supported by NTV) by sub-regions, Russian parliamentary elections, 1999. White areas indicate missing election 
data. The calculation of the persuasion rates   
For a positive message, the basic formula we start with is , 
here   is the number of people who would have voted for parties supported by a 
media outlet (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010), e is the exposure to the message. Like 
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) we implicitly assume that persuasion applies equally 
to supporters of other parties and to non-voters. What we do differently is that we do 
not apply the restriction that turnout should necessarily increase after receiving the 
message, i.e., some people who would have voted for other parties do not necessarily 
turn up to vote. In addition, we look at the infinitesimally small change in exposure, 
which is driven by our empirical approach. 
From the baseline formula, it follows that  , and, consequently, 
 (a  corresponding  formula  in  the  discrete  case  is  ). 
Note that as  , where t is turnout and   is the share of the vote for supported 
parties, one can rewrite the formula as  . Thus, 
the persuasion rate is equal to the sum of the effects of the message on the vote share 
and on turnout. (The analogues formula in the discrete case is:  .) 
For a negative message,   (here z is the number of 
people who would vote for parties opposed by NTV if exposure is e and persuasion 
rate is f), as persuasion affects those who would have voted for parties opposed by the 











!"  (here ! is the share of vote for opposed parties). In the discrete case, 
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00 0 (1 ) zz z e fz e f = ! = !Comparison of aggregate- and individual-level results 
In this section we compare the magnitude of the effects of NTV from the 
individual-level survey data and from the aggregate official election data (Table 2 vs. 
Table 7). The persuasion rate of the negative message estimated using individual data 
is similar to the one estimated using the aggregate-level data, whereas the persuasion 
rate of the positive message implied by the individual-level results is substantially 
higher. There are several potential methodological explanations for this discrepancy 
between the aggregate- and individual-level results. 
First,  in  contrast  to  the  aggregate-level  analysis,  in  the  individual-level 
regressions we cannot control for regional fixed effects as the survey typically was 
administered in only one sub-region of each region, so that there is no within-region 
variation  of  NTV  availability  in  the  individual-level  sample.  Unobserved  regional 
variation is likely to play an important role, since there is a substantial difference in 
ethnic, religious, economic, and political characteristics among Russia’s regions. For 
example,  most  regional  governors  were  active  supporters  of  either  the  main 
opposition party OVR or the pro-government party Unity. The political preferences of 
the governor could have had a noticeable effect on the outcome of the election in the 
respective region and on the preferences of the regional population over which TV 
channels to watch. The comparison of the aggregate-level results with and without 
regional  fixed  effects  (not  reported)  indicates  that  the  omission  of  regional  fixed 
effects leads to a two-fold increase in the estimated effect of the NTV availability on 
the vote for OVR, Unity, and SPS, whereas the results for Yabloko remain similar in 
size. Therefore, omitting regional fixed effects can explain some of the difference in 
magnitude between aggregate and individual results.  Second, since the individual-level data are available only for a subsample of 
sub-regions,  one  should  worry  about  whether  the  sample  is  representative,  as  the 
survey designers claim. To verify the representativeness of the sample of sub-regions 
included into the survey, we checked that aggregate-level results for the subsample of 
sub-regions where survey data were collected are only slightly larger as compare to 
the results for all sub-regions and, therefore, differences in the samples cannot explain 
differences in the estimated effects. 
Panel and placebo regressions for individual-level results 
Just  as  in  the  aggregate-level  analysis  for  four  parties  we  can  use  difference-in-
difference approach for individual-level data. The data on voting in 1995 come from 
the survey, similar to the one conducted in 1999, but with different respondents and, 
sometimes, in different regions. Thus, unlike the aggregate-level analysis we cannot 
include fixed effects for individuals or regions and we estimate probit regression that 
includes as the dependent variables only the measure of NTV availability, constant, 
and dummy for the year 1999. We cluster the error term at the sub-regional level. As 
in the case of aggregate-level analysis we code NTV availability to be equal to zero in 
all sub-regions in 1995, as the NTV audience at that time was negligible. Thus, we 
estimate the effect of the differential increase in NTV availability on the election 
results from 1995 to 1999 on the probability of voting for different parties. Table A3 
presents the results. Just as in the aggregate-level analysis, NTV has a significant 
positive effect on the probability of voting for the two liberal parties. In addition, the 
negative effect of NTV on voting for KPRF and positive effect of voting on voter 
turnout become significant in the individual-level panel results. 
 Also,  as  in  the  aggregate-level  analysis,  we  estimate  placebo  regressions 
using survey data from 1995 to test the validity of our main identification assumption. Table A4 reports the results of this placebo experiment. We estimate the effect of 
NTV availability in 1999 (defined in the same way as in the aggregate-level analysis) 
on the probability of voting for each of the major parties during the 1995 election 
using a probit model with the same set of controls as in all other individual-level 
regressions, except for the consumption index, which cannot be calculated using the 
data  from  1995  survey.  Consistent  with  our  assumption  of  idiosyncratic  NTV 
availability  in  1999,  the  estimated  coefficients  of  interest  are  never  statistically 
significant and the marginal effects are very close to zero. Table A3. Self-reported vote and NTV, survey data 
  Supported by NTV in 1999  Similar coverage by NTV and 
state TV in 1999   
 






Vote for  
Yabloko 
(liberal) 






  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
NTV Availability  1.667  1.278  -0.795  0.602  0.802 
  [0.620]***  [0.505]**  [0.382]**  [0.620]  [0.369]** 
Year dummy for 1999  0.16  0.14  -0.27  0.06  0.21 
  [0.05]***  [0.06]**  [0.13]**  [0.06]  [0.10]** 
Constant  -4.458  -2.986  -0.178  -1.363  0.22 
  [0.469]***  [0.399]***  [0.327]  [0.407]***  [0.241] 
Observations  1522  1522  1522  1522  1944 
Probit model. Observations are weighted by sample survey weights. Vector of controls includes dummy variables for gender, 
age, marital status, education, logarithms of sub-regional population, and average wage. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clusters by sub-region in brackets. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table A4. Placebo regressions for self-reported vote in 1995, survey data 
  Supported by NTV in 1999  Similar coverage by NTV and 
state TV in 1999     
 















Vote for LDPR 
in 1995 
(nationalist) 





  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
NTV Availability in 1999  0.175  -0.235  -0.113  0.589  0.554  0.429 
  [1.015]  [0.673]  [0.617]  [0.879]  [0.756]  [0.777] 
Marginal Effect  0.01  -0.03  -0.04  0.08  0.09  0.10 
  [0.04]  [0.09]  [0.20]  [0.12]  [0.13]  [0.18] 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  552  552  552  552  552  672 
Number of sub-regions  38  38  38  38  38  38 
Probit model. Observations are weighted by sample survey weights. Vector of controls includes dummy variables for gender, 
age, marital status, education, consumption index, logarithms of sub-regional population, and average wage. Robust standard 
errors adjusted for clusters by sub-region in brackets. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Survey 
weights are applied. 
 
 